We have put in place a policy clarifications process, allowing firms to write to us at Appscamspolicyclarifications@psr.org.uk, requesting clarity on the policy statements and legal instruments. We have started to upload the responses below and will update the page as more become available.

When a consumer is assessed as being vulnerable, preventing the sending PSP from deducting any claim excess, how should the reimbursement contribution of the receiving PSP be calculated?

Paragraph 5.13 of our legal instrument, Specific Requirement 1 (Faster Payments APP scam reimbursement rules), states that a receiving PSP may choose to deduct 50% of the maximum claim excess value

(i.e. £100 as set out in the Maximum Excess – Notice of Value) from the specified contribution in circumstances where the sending PSP ‘chooses’ not to levy the excess, or ‘chooses’ to levy an excess of a lower value than the maximum.

If a customer is vulnerable within the meaning Paragraph 5.17 of Specific Requirement 1, no such choice is open to the sending PSP and, in that circumstance, Paragraph 5.13 does not apply, and the receiving PSP is not permitted to make such a deduction.

What is the course of action if funds are recovered by the sending PSP rather than the receiving PSP?

Our June policy statement refers to repatriation of losses, where the receiving PSP can detect, freeze, and return funds stolen as part of an APP scam. Paragraph 5.42 of that policy statement explains that, where a receiving PSP recovers and can repatriate funds, and when the customer has already been reimbursed by the sending PSP, repatriated funds should be shared between the sending and receiving PSPs to cover what they paid out as reimbursement, reflecting the split adopted by the PSPs at the time of reimbursement.

We recognise that there may theoretically be circumstances in which a sending PSP could successfully repatriate funds from the fraudster, but we consider these cases, if they were to occur, would be extremely rare. In the unlikely circumstance that a case like this emerges, we would expect the same principle to apply to funds repatriated by the sending PSP. PSPs should not retain sums in excess of their losses or liabilities. We will collect data on the operation of our policy once it comes into effect.

In what circumstances is it valid for a PSP to use the “stop the clock” mechanism?

Section 5 of Specific Requirement 1 (Faster Payments APP scam reimbursement rules) sets out the time limits for a Payment Service Provider to reimburse any reimbursable FSP APP scam payment, including the limited circumstances under which a sending Payment Service Provider may ‘stop the clock’.

What if the victim is working with the fraudster?

Our policy publications make clear that a consumer who is themselves party to the fraud or dishonesty giving rise to their claim (including ‘First Party Fraud’) is ineligible for reimbursement.

Is my financial firm within scope of the reimbursement policy?

We published, in December 2023, our legal instrument directed to Payment Service Providers, Specific Direction 20 (Faster Payments APP scam reimbursement requirement). That publication makes clear that ‘the PSR gives the following specific direction to all PSPs participating in the Faster Payments Scheme that provide relevant accounts’, and at Paragraph 4.1 that ‘From 7 October 2024, all directed PSPs, whether they are members or not of the Faster Payments Scheme must comply with the FPS reimbursement rules.’

How should a sending PSP, when assessing a claim, treat payments to and from mule accounts?

Page 19 of PSR 23/3 illustrates that, where a mule account is a feature of an APP scam, the in-scope transaction is the initial transaction between the victim and the mule.

Page 19 of PSR 23/3 also illustrates that any onward transmission from a mule account to a fraudster does not constitute an in-scope transaction. The liability is jointly shared between the PSP providing a sending account to the victim, and the PSP providing a receiving account for the money mule.

I have been the victim of an APP Scam recently. Is my case in scope of the PSR’s policy?

The scope of our reimbursement requirement applies to all reimbursable APP scam payments made on or after the start date of this policy (7 October 2024). Any payments made before the coming into effect of our policy are not within its scope.